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Chapter One

History and Psychology
Three Weddings and a Future

Kenneth J. Gergen

Psychological science and historical scholarship have not always been congenial
companions. For many historians, psychology has been a suspicious enterprise, an
uneven fledgling in the intellectual world, disingenuously arrogating to itself the
status of a natural science. Further, psychology’s implicit agenda is hegemonic. In the
present case, if psychological science furnishes foundational knowledge regarding
human behavior, and historical study is largely devoted to understanding just such
conduct across time, then history stands to be absorbed by the science—ancillary
and subsidiary. Psychology’s attitude toward history has been equally distant. As a
child of cultural modernism, psychological science has treated historical inquiry with
little more than tolerant civility. Psychology has been an enterprise struggling to
develop general laws through scientific (and largely experimental) methods. Because
of its newly fashioned commitment to empirical methods, preceding scholarship of
the mind or scholarship about earlier mentalities was necessarily impaired. In an
important sense, the past was a shroud to be cast away. Psychologists might scan
historical accounts of earlier times in search of interesting hypotheses or anecdotes,
but the results would most likely confirm the widely shared suspicion that contempo
rary research—controlled and systematic—was far superior in its conclusions. From
the psychologist’s standpoint, historians are backward looking, while the proper
emphasis of research should be placed on building knowledge for the future.
Slowly, however, these disciplinary antipathies have begun to subside. With the
emergence of new cultural topoi—globalization, ecology, information explosion,
multiculturalism, and postmodernity among them—we encounter increased sensi
tivity to the artificial and often obfuscating thrall of disciplinarity. Division and
specialization are falteringly but increasingly replaced by curiosity, dialogue, and an
optimistic sense of new and fascinating futures. It is with the shape of this future
that the present chapter is concerned. A marriage of history and psychology can take
many forms, and reflexive concern over their differing potentials and shortcomings
is essential. It is not merely a matter of intellectual and scholarly promise; long
standing traditions hang in the balance—to be strengthened or dissolved accord
ingly. These traditions are further linked to broader societal practices of moral and
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political consequence. In choosing our mode of inquiry, so do we fashion a cultural
future.
With these concerns in mind, I wish to consider three contrasting orientations to
this blending of orientations: history as psychological expression, history as psycho
logical progenitor, and psychological discourse as history. Wherever possible, we shall
keep issues of the emotions in the foreground; however, where the literature directs
us to other psychological states and conditions, we shall find that the conclusions are
also relevant to the emotions. I will not pretend to be impartial in this analysis.
Indeed, the issue of moral and political impartiality is central to the discussion. At
the same time, I make no claims to clairvoyance in these matters. These remarks are
not intended as conclusive—the end of the conversation—so much as invitations to
collective reflection on the building of a viable future.

History as Psychological Expression
My chief concern in the present analysis is the set of assumptions traditionally
grounding central inquiry in both the psychological and historical domains. These
assumptions, I will argue, while inviting certain forms of communication between
history and psychology, are also problematic and delimiting in significant respects.
Further, within certain forms of historical psychology, these assumptions are giving
way to significant alternatives. For many, these latter developments represent im
portant threats to the relevant disciplines. However, as I shall argue, these threats are
more than offset by the manifold advantages, both to historical/psychological study
and for societal life more generally.
Let us briefly consider several pivotal assumptions that traditionally conjoin these
domains. I shall not lay out the terrain in any detail in this essay, as the assumptive
paradigm is well elaborated within twentieth-century philosophy of science (as
emerging within 1920s positivism and extending through logical empiricism to the
Popperian extenuations in critical rationalism), and deeply embedded as an implicit
forestructure within the everyday activities of scholars and scientists themselves.
Briefly to recapitulate four of the central working assumptions within vast sectors of
the disciplines today, we find commitments to the following:
1. An independent subject matter. Until recent years, historians and psychologists
have virtually assumed the existence of their subject matters independent of the
particular passions and predilections of the inquiring agent. This obdurate subject
matter—given in nature—is there to be recorded, measured, described, and ana
lyzed. Experience of this subject matter may serve as an inductive basis for the
generation of knowledge or understanding. Contrasting accounts of the world may
be compared against the range of existents to determine their relative validity.
2. An essentialist view of mind. Historians have largely joined psychologists in
presuming that among the important subject matters to be explored are specifically
mental processes, their antecedents and manifestations. Because human action is
based on a psychological substratum (including, for example, emotion, thought,
intention, and motivation), an illumination of psychological functioning is essential
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■for historical knowledge (lest history become a mere chronicle of events). Mental
process is the pivotal focus of psychological science.
3. Understanding as objective and cumulative. Psychologists have expended great
effort to insure the objective assessment of their subject matter. Instrumentation,
computer control, experimental design, and test validation studies are only a few of
the safeguards to objectivity. Although few historians would claim the world of the
past to be transparent, most would agree that through the examination of manu
scripts, letters, diaries, and other artifacts, one can construct accounts of the past
that shed increasing light on the actual occurrences. Objective understanding may
not be fully achievable, but the goal can be approximated in ever advancing degree.
Further, in both disciplines objectivity serves as the foundation for cumulative
knowledge. With increasing study of a given phenomenon—whether psychological
depression or the Great Depression—scholars can achieve more fully detailed under
standing.
4. Value neutrality. The pervasive tendency in historical and psychological inquiry
has been a claim to ideological nonpartisanship. To be sure, scholars and scientists
may harbor strong personal values, but these should in no way influence the assaying
of evidence or the resulting account of the subject matter. The quest for objectivity
in both cases is simultaneously linked to a belief in objectivity as liberation from
ideology.
In large measure, these shared assumptions are also responsible for the emergence
of a small but robust movement toward a historical psychology. Given broad
agreement in metaphysical assumptions, a variegated range of exciting and challeng
ing explorations into the interrelations between psychological process and historical
change has emerged. It will be useful for the present analysis to draw several of these
enterprises into focus, and then to examine several problematic implications. With
these issues in place, we can turn to two further developments that offer alternative
weavings of the historical and the psychological.
Assumptions in Action: Historical Psychology
As indicated, the assumptions outlined here essentially prefigure the dominant
postures of inquiry. If we presume the existence of psychological process (entities,
mechanisms, dispositions, etc.), along with an objectified historical context (that is,
a context that exists independently of mental representation), then we are disposed
to analyses that causally link mental predicates with historically specific events or
actions. Two major forms of inquiry are favored: the first illuminating psychological
origins of historically located actions, and the second focused on the psychological
outcomes of specific historical conditions. While interactions between psychological
and historical conditions are rare but noteworthy, most research tends to favor one
of these causal sequences or the other. In the case of psychological origins, perhaps
the premier efforts have been those of psychohistorians (see, for example, DeMause,
1982; Loewenberg, 1983; Brown, 1959), who typically presume the existence of various
psychodynamic processes and focus analysis on the ways these processes manifest
themselves in various historical events. Such analyses may consider the psychody-
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namic conditions of people at a given era of history (for example, Fromm, 1941), or
the individual psychology of significant historical figures (for example, Erikson,
1975). While Martindale’s work (especially 1975,1990) on psychological motives giving
rise to aesthetic appreciation and interests places primary stress on the mind as origin
of history, his work is especially interesting in demonstrating that psychological states
create context effects that loop back to alter their own character. Thus, for Martindale
there are predictable historical trajectories derived from psychohistorical interactions.
Increasingly prevalent, however, is research in which mental states and expressions
are positioned as effects of particular historical conditions. This work does not
propose that psychological processes are products of these conditions; rather, the
analyst presumes the existence of fundamental psychological processes (e.g., cogni
tive, emotional, motivational, etc.), and views the historical context as shaping their
content, character, or expression. In effect, we might say, there is a historical texturing
of the psychological. Work of this sort has sprung from many sources. There has
been a long-standing concern, for example, with the ways processes of child develop
ment are situated within particular historical milieus (Aries, 1962; van den Berg, 1961;
Kessen, 1990). Wide-ranging works such as those of Elias (1978) on the civilizing
process, Ong (1982) on forms of cognition favored by oral as opposed to print
cultures, and Elder (1974) on the psychological effects of the Great Depression also
stand as important contributions to this form of inquiry. Researchers such as Simonton (1984, 1990) have even attempted to generate means of quantifying historical
variables so as to predict historically specific levels of creativity, genius, or leadership.
Perhaps the most extensive and concerted work within this domain has been that of
Stearns and Stearns, including their history of anger in the American context (Stearns
and Stearns, 1986), the evolution of jealousy in recent history (Stearns, 1989), and the
fate of Victorian passions in twentieth-century life (Stearns, 1994). Further exemplars
of inquiry in these various domains is contained in the volume Historical Social
Psychology (Gergen and Gergen, 1984).
Approaching the Limits of the Tradition
As we find, each of the traditional assumptions outlined earlier is clearly manifest
in these lines of inquiry. Each presumes the independent existence of its subject
matter, the psyche as a “natural kind” available to scientific appraisal, research as
objective and cumulative, and the research enterprise not itself ideologically invested.
A significant enrichment of understanding has resulted from the pursuit of these
assumptions, including among them the very development of the social/behavioral
sciences as significant disciplines on the cultural landscape; an emerging sense of
unity in questions of knowledge, its importance, and how it is to be pursued and
taught; and an enormous body of inquiry serving to stimulate the intellect, the
imagination, and public practice. Yet while there is much to be said for these
endeavors, it is also important to realize their limitations. That we should applaud
the traditional efforts is not in question; whether a single paradigm should suffice is
yet another matter.
Three critical issues demand attention in the present context. At the outset, it is
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important to realize that the assumptions giving rise to this form of inquiry are
themselves derived from a historically situated intelligibility. The assumptions as
articulated give the impression of “first principles,” foundations that transcend
historical and cultural context. Yet the historically sensitive analyst will draw atten
tion to the social conditions under which these assumptions emerged, and the part
they may have played within the political and economic context of the time. The
“grounding” assumptions, then, derive their legitimacy not from transcendent veri
ties but from specific conditions of society. And if this is so, then there is no binding
necessity for maintaining them to the exclusion of others. Or more positively, because
they are optional they may be opened to broad-ranging scrutiny and alternatives
invited.^
Such scrutiny begins in earnest when it is realized that these pivotal assumptions
furnish no means of critical self- reflection. Once they are set in motion, there are
no means of questioning their premises or intelligibly raising questions falling
outside the ontology they circumscribe. Once it is agreed that knowledge is accumu
lated through empirical assessment of the world’s givens, it is difficult to challenge
this assumption. To question it on grounds that did not assume the ontology (e.g.,
on spiritual grounds) would be irrelevant to the venture (e.g., “mere mysticism”). To
put empiricism to empirical test would be equally problematic. It would be concep
tual mischief to suppose that empirical methods could prove themselves untrue.
Yet the problem is not limited to an incapacity for self- reflexivity. As we find,
once the paradigm is in motion, all questions falling outside the bounded domain of
empirical knowledge are placed in jeopardy. In particular, critics have long been
concerned with the inability of the traditional orientation to speak to questions of
human value. Because the language of value cannot unequivocally be linked to events
in the material world, issues of value have been largely removed from discussion.
Further, the pursuit of knowledge is concerned with establishing what is (or was) the
case, it is said, and not with promulgating a canon of “oughts.” Objective inquiry is
not in the business of ideological propaganda. Yet, as critics insist, in his or her
choice of descriptive terminology, explanatory base, method of exploration, and
rationalizing metaphysics, the scientist/scholar is also acting in the world and inevita
bly shaping its future for good or ill. In spite of erstwhile claims to value neutrality,
then, traditional research pursuits are inevitably ideological. Means must be found,
it is argued, to restore a sense of moral and political responsibility to such endeavors.
There is a final issue, less profound in implication, but nonetheless significant.
This concerns the tensions inhering in the dominant traditions of history and
psychology, and the ways they are resolved within various forms of interdisciplinary
work. Of particular concern, psychological study has generally, though not exclu
sively, been a generalizing discipline. That is, the chief attempt is to establish knowl
edge of human functioning that transcends both time and culture. In contrast, most
(but not all) historical analysis has tended to be particularizing, concerned with the
unique configuration of circumstances existing at different periods of time. In terms
of our preceding discussion, these differences in propensity are not without political
significance. For the generalizing disciplines, a conception of human nature as
relatively fixed (of genetic origin) tends to prevail. Thus, there is a preference for
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explaining various social ills (e.g., aggression, poverty, drug use) in terms of individ
ual, inherent tendencies, with an associated preference for strong state controls and
political conservativism. (“One cannot change human nature, but only control its
excesses.”) For the particularizing scholar, the tendency is to view human nature as
more mutable and multi-potentiated. Societal problems are more likely to be under
stood in terms of the particular configuration of circumstances (e.g., economic,
attitudes and values, quality of governance), with policy solutions favoring collabora
tion and creativity over control and punishment.
In this context we find that many of the efforts just described, in their assumption
of human action as an effect or expression of a fixed psychological substrate, will
tend to privilege the universal over the particular. The existence of the emotions, for
example, is never doubted; their expressions and effects essentially constitute the
historical. Such expressions may be controlled, channeled, or suppressed, but the
fundament remains fixed. Thus, psychological process remains a prevailing force in
the generation of historical events, and the history of psychological processes can be
written only in terms of the variations on the fundamental theme. We can appreciate
these contentions more fully by contrasting this initial orientation with a second.

The Historical Constitution of the Psyche
In important respects, the second line of psychohistorical inquiry represents a more
extreme version of the texturing approach just discussed. However, rather than the
historical context serving to give content or conditions of expression to an otherwise
fixed domain of psychological functioning, here we find that the historical constitutes
the mental. That is, mental processes—both the ontology of the mind and the
specific manifestations—are by-products of antecedent historical conditions. These
conditions may be material: for Marxist historians, psychological conditions of self
alienation and false consciousness are the specific outcome of conditions of labor.
The reconfiguration of labor would essentially eradicate these particular states of
mind. For the most part, however, scholars have looked to the social conditions as
the primary formative agents of psychological process.
This approach has been most inviting for a range of psychological states that are
either marginal or controversial to the society more generally. Thus we are not at all
discomforted by accounts of the social history of romantic love (for example. Hunt,
1959; Kern, 1992). Possibly because many feel uncertain that they never have or will
experience such a state, and possibly because romantic love is essentially problematic
to an Enlightenment ideal of a rational and objective functioning of the mind, there
is a certain relief attendant on such historization.
However, the intellectual and ideological stakes are raised considerably when such
analysis turns to psychological predicates more pivotal to our public institutions. For
example, the radical implications of Lev Vygotsky’s (1978) views on human develop
ment have not been lost on the professional psychologist. For Vygotsky, “There is
nothing in mind that is not first of all in society” (142). In effect, for Vygotsky the
processes of thinking and memory are not there in nature, prior to culture, but owe
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their very existence to cultural antecedents. At the same time, this view serves as a
strong invitation to historical analysis. The periodist may attempt to locate unique
psychological states resonating with the configuration of cultural conditions domi
nant at a given time. Exemplary is Badinter’s (1980) analysis of the mother’s “instinc
tive” love for her child, its genesis traced to particular political and intellectual
conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. My own work (Gergen, 1991)
attempts to link various senses of self (as variously possessing a deep interiority,
unity) to earlier eras, and argues for the contemporary (postmodern) erosion of this
sensibility. Harre and Finlay-Jones’s (1986) explorations of accidie and melancholy in
the early European context are also apposite. Although cross- cultural in its focus.
Lutz’s work on the social constitution of emotions such as fago and song in the Ifaluk
people of the southwest Pacific is highly compelling. Contributions to Harre’s (1986)
edited collection. The Social Construction of Emotions, add important dimension to
the form of study.
It is noteworthy that most of the research on the sociohistorical constitution of
mind has not been carried out hy «mpirically oriented psychologi.s|:s. This is perhaps
not surprising, inasmuch as the implications of such work for traditional empirical
psychology are little short of devastating. At the outset, such inquiry challenges the
essentialism so endemic to psychological science, and so necessary to its claims to be
studying “universal man.” Not only is the search for transhistorical and transcultural
generalizations thrown into question, but the very assumption of the science as
cumulative is jeopardized. Today’s empirical results, on this account, are indicators
not of universal truths, but of historically contingent customs (see Gergen, 1994a).
Or in terms of our previous concerns, this form of analysis reverses the privilege of
the psychological over the historical. Here psychology becomes a tributary of histori
cal analysis.
When their implications are extended, such analyses also favor a self-reflexive
posture. This is primarily so because the analyst comes to appreciate the historical
contingency of the very conceptions of human knowledge giving rise to historical
study itself. For example, if mentalities are socially constituted, what are we to make
of the concept of objectivity as state of mind, and the assumption of an unbiased
relationship between a private subjectivity and the objects of study? The very idea of
a mind separate from the world, existing within the body, and reflecting the contours
of an external world becomes open to historical reflection (see, for example, Rorty,
1979). If subjectivity is socially constituted, then isn’t all scientific description and
explanation colored by (if not derivative of) the community conventions of the time?
A space is opened, then, for self-reflexive dialogue.
Further, a view of minds as historically constituted begins to generate a moral and
political sensitivity. In particular, if the mental is socially constituted, then forms of
psychological being are essentially optional. And if they are optional, we may inquire
into the desirability of existing modes of being, and the potentials inherent in
potential alternatives. To illustrate, Averill (1982) argues for anger as a form of
culturally situated performance. Anger in Western culture, for example, is not dupli
cated elsewhere, and what we might wish to term anger in many other cultures
scarcely resembles what we take to be anger in our own. Under these circumstances.
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we in contemporary Western culture can raise questions about the desirability of our
current construction of anger. Based on this premise, Tavris (1982) argues for a
transformation in our cultural constructions, so as to reduce family violence and
other crimes of aggression. More recently, Averill and Nunley (1992) extend these
arguments to propose that people should create the emotional forms essential for
fulfilling lives.
Finally, we find in this orientation the seeds for a dramatic recasting of the role of
historian in matters of psychology. As we found in the preceding analysis, once
mentalities are objectified, they will tend to make pivotal demands on all his
torical analysis. However, if the mental world is historically constituted, then histori
cal understanding is essential to any further analysis of mind. The work of the
historian becomes a necessary prolegomenon for further understanding in psycho
logical science. To launch research into any psychological “phenomenon” without a
grasp of the textual history giving rise to the very presumption of a phenomenon
would be cavalier, to say the least. To carry out research without a sense of the
sociocultural forestructure that sets the limits of the project’s intelligibility would be
myopic.
In spite of the profound implications of inquiry into the historical constitution of
the psyche, it must be said that its practitioners have not typically been among the
most active in pressing forward its more radical implications. In spite of the tensions,
most of this work has proceeded within the traditional metatheoretical thrall. Prac
titioners have primarily set out to do illuminating historical work, justified in
terms of its evidential base and without a particular ethico-political agenda. Such
provocation is saved for a third form of psychohistorical inquiry.

Psychological Discourse in Historical Context
The most recent turn in scholarship is a dialogic companion to an array of interre
lated movements recently sweeping the humanities and social sciences more broadly.
These movements—variously indexed as poststructural, post-empiricist, post-foundational, post-Enlightenment, and postmodern—all tend to converge in their con
cerns on the construction of meaning through language and within community. That
is, in varying ways they draw attention to the multiplicity of ways differing commtnlities construct, typically in language, a local sense of the real and the good. Further,
as it is commonly argued, because such constructions create and sustain particular
forms of conduct, they simultaneously operate as forces of control or power within
society. Most pointedly, as it is proposed, those standing at the margins of such
communities may become subject to what, for them, are oppressive if not annihilative
consequences of construction.^
These have been stirring if not dramatic dialogues, and their implications farreaching. Of particular relevance to the present chapter, they have stimulated an
alternative from of scholarship, devoted in this case to the historical and cultural
circumstances giving rise to particular vocabularies in the ordering of social conduct.
The argument here is not that mental events are socially constituted, as in the
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previous case. For most of these scholars the existence of mental life itself is undecidable. That is, whether or not there is “mental life” and how (if it exists) it is
constituted are not questions generally felt to be answerable outside the confines of a
particular interpretive community. The major concern, then, is with the discourses
of mental life, people’s actions made apparent or possible through such discourses,
and the functioning of these discourses (and associated actions) within society over
time.
Emotions as Discourse: An Illustration
To convey the logic of this work, I will illustrate with the discourse of the
emotions. Attempts to define the emotions and elucidate their character have orna
mented the intellectual landscape for over two thousand years. Two characteristics
of this continuing colloquy are particularly noteworthy: first, the presumption of
palpability, and second, the interminability of debate. In the former case, until the
present century there has been little doubting the obdurate existence of the emotions.
In the second book of the Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguished among fifteen emotional
states; Aquinas’s Summa theologiae enumerated six “affective” and five “spirited”
emotions; Descartes distinguished among six primary passions of the soul; the
eighteenth-century moralist David Hartley located ten “general passions of human
nature”; and the major contributions by recent theorists, Tomkins (1962) and Izard
(1977), describe some ten distinctive emotional states. In effect, in Western cultural
history there is unflinching agreement regarding the palpable presence of emotional
states.
At the same time, these deep ontological commitments are also matched by a
virtual cacophony of competing views on the character of the emotions—their
distinguishing characteristics, origins, manifestations, and significance in human
affairs. For Aristotle the emotions constituted “motions of the soul”; for Aquinas the
emotions were experienced by the soul, but were the products of sensory appetites;
Descartes isolated specific “passions of the soul,” these owing to movements of the
“animal spirits” agitating the brain. For Thomas Hobbes (1651), the passions were
constitutive of human nature itself, and furnished the activating “spirit” for the
intellect, the will, and moral character. In his Treatise on Human Nature (1739), David
Hume divided the passions into those directly derived from human instinct (e.g., the
desire to punish our enemies), and those that derive from a “double relation” of
•sensory impressions and ideas. A century later, both Spencer’s Principles of Psychology
and Darwin’s Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals attempted to place the
emotions on more seemingly certain biological grounds.
This interminability of debate is most effectively illustrated when we consider the
“object of study” itself, that which is identified as an emotion. For example, Aristotle
identified placability, confidence, benevolence, churlishness, resentment, emulation,
longing, and enthusiasm as emotional states no less transparent than anger or joy. Yet,
in their twentieth-century exegeses, neither Tomkins (1962) nor Izard (1977) recog
nizes these states as constituents of the emotional domain. Aquinas believed that
love, desire, hope, and courage were all central emotions, and while Aristotle agreed in
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the case of love, all such states go virtually unrecognized in the recent theories of
Tomkins and Izard. Hohbes identified covetousness, luxury, curiosity, ambition, good
naturedness, superstition, and will as emotional states, none of which qualifies as such
in contemporary psychology. Tompkins and Izard agree that surprise is an emotion,
a belief that would indeed surprise most of their predecessors. However, whereas
Izard believes that sadness and guilt are major emotions, they fail to qualify in
Tompkins’s analysis; simultaneously, Tompkins sees distress as a central emotion,
while Izard does not.
There is a certain irony inhering in these two features of emotional debate,
palpability and interminability. If the emotions are simply there as transparent
features of human existence, why should univocality be so different to achieve? Broad
agreement exists within scientific communities concerning, for example, chemical
tables, genetic constitution, and the movements of the planets; and where disagree
ments have developed, procedures have also been located for pressing the nomencla
ture toward greater uniformity. Why, then, is scientific convergence so elusive in the
case of emotions? At least one significant reason for the continuous contention
derives from a presumptive fallacy, namely, Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced concrete
ness. Possibly we labor in a tradition in which we mistakenly treat the putative objects
of our mental vocabulary as palpable, whereas it is the names themselves that possess
more indubitable properties. Because there are words such as love, anger, and guilt,
we presume that there must be specific psychological states to which they refer. And
if there is disagreement, we presume that continued study of the matter will set the
matter straight. After two thousand years of debate on the matter, one is ineluctably
led to suppose that there are no such isolable conditions to which such terms refer.
This latter possibility has become more compelling within recent years, and
particularly with the development of ordinary language philosophy. Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations was the major stimulus in this case, both questioning the
referential base for mental predicates and offering an alternative way of accounting
for such discourse. As Wittgenstein (1953) asks, “I give notice that I am afraid.—Do
I recall my thoughts of the past half hour in order to do that, or do I let a thought of
the dentist quickly cross my mind in order to see how it affects me; or can I be
uncertain of whether it is really fear of the dentist, and not some other physical
feeling of discomfort?” (sze). The impossibility of answering such a question in
terms of mental referents for the emotion demands an alternative means of under
standing mental terms. This understanding is largely to be found in Wittgenstein’s
arguments for use-derived meaning. On this view, mental predicates acquire their
meaning through various language games embedded within cultural forms of life.
Mental language is rendered significant not by virtue of its capacity to reveal, mark,
or describe mental states, but by its function in social interchange.
Historicizing Psychological Discourse: Instances and Implications
Arguments of the preceding kind inform a genre of historical work concerned not
only with emotion, but also with the full range of discourses on the nature of psycho
logical functioning. The focus of inquiry is variously on the genesis and sustenance df
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psychological discourse, its modes of functioning within society, and the values and
groups that it sustains (and suppresses). Illustrative are Suzanne BCirschner’s (1996) ex
ploration of the way contemporary conceptions of psychological development echo
the narratives of neo-Platonist theological texts; David Leary’s (1990) edited collection
on the place of metaphor in the history of psychological theorizing; Gigerenzer’s (1991)
analysis of the influence of statistical methodology on psychology’s emerging concep
tion of cognitive functioning; Hacking’s (1995) Rewriting the Soul, a historical inquiry
into the conceptions of multiple personality and the politics of memory; Spacks’s
(1995) exploration of the emergence of boredom in the eighteenth century; and Her
man’s (1992) inquiry into the political roots of the discourse of psychic trauma. A
broad sampling of historical work on psychological discourse is also contained in His
torical Dimensions of Psychological Discourse (Graumann and Gergen, 1996).
This latter work begins to form a significant alternative to the stance of value
neutrality pervading both the preceding psychohistorical enterprises. That is, rather
than simply reflecting on the nature of the past, these latter inquiries use historical
work in the service of moral/ethical critique with the aim of altering the shape of
cultural action. This kind of value-based analysis is specifically invited by the as
sumption that what we take to be human action is neither given as an essence nor
fixed within individuals as cultural disposition; rather, human action is woven into
the fabric of discursive understandings. Thus, if the scholar can alter such forms of
understanding—as in the case of the historicization of psychological discourse—
then we enter a clearing in which choice is possible. To understand that the psycholo
gist’s conceptions of emotion, for example, are not maps of human nature but,,the
outcomes of cultural tradition enables us to reflect on the relative value of these
conceptions in comparison with other possibilities. The discourse is not fixed, but is
rendered optional. Particularly illustrative of these concerns are Rose’s (1985, 1990)
Foucauldian explorations of the role of the discourse and methods of professional
psychology in the political “disciplining” of the society; Lutz’s (1988) critique of the
androcentric biases fostered by the discourse of emotions in contemporary Western
culture; and Sampson’s (1988) analysis of the individualist ideology sustained by
emerging conceptions of mental life.
The implications of this growing corpus of work for more traditional historical
and psychological inquiry seem, at the outset, little short of annihilative. From the\
discursive perspective, it is difficult to locate a subject matter that is independent of
the discursive/theoretical projects of the investigating agents. The very idea of an
“independent subject matter”—whether the mind or history itself—lapses into
incoherence. And with this turn, of course, so do essentialist conceptions of mental
events or processes. If anything, these inquiries demonstrate the tenuous (if not
tautological) relationship between our language of the mind and its putative refer
ents. Further, the aspiration for an objective science/history begins to whither. Yes,
the sense of objectivity may be achieved within a particular community of interlocu
tors. However, the scientist/scholar loses the warrant for claiming truth beyond
community, some privileged relationship between words and world. Similarly, knowl
edge may accumulate, but only by virtue of the standards shared within an interpre
tive community.
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Yet in the end, the annihilative implications of these arguments cannot be sus
tained. Should the discursive critic make claims to the truth of his/her critique, then
the very grounds from which they issue are removed. More positively, this is to say
that discursive inquiry does succeed in avoiding the pitfalls of gainsaying its own
rationale. Whereas traditional inquiry has no means of questioning its own premises
(e.g., presumptions of objectivity, value neutrality), the discursive scholar is invited
into a posture of humility. Thus, the discursive critique of the traditions must itself
be viewed as a discursive move, a means of carrying on intellectual life within the
scholarly community, and relating this community to the broader society. The
arguments essentially serve as an invitation to forms of conversation and relationship
that may offer new alternatives for inquiry and new roles for the scholar.
Finally, we find that from the discursive perspective, neither psychology nor
history is furnished an ultimate explanatory privilege. Neither psychological nor
historical events are celebrated as the generative sources of action. In the discursive
account, psychological processes are bracketed, thus seeming to give explanatory
privilege to historical analysis. At the same time, one might counter that discourse
analysis now replaces mental states as the central focus of historical analysis. How
ever, because psychological discourse is integral to (and not separated from) social
process, it is neither a cause nor an effect of social pattern. In effect, discourse both
constitutes and is constituted by the historically located conditions of the culture.
Neither mind nor material are paramount.

History and Psychology: Is There a Future?
We have surveyed three significant departures in the marriage of historical and
psychological scholarship, the first drawing on traditional essentialist assumptions
regarding both history and psychology, the second emphasizing the historical consti
tution of the psychological domain, and the third transforming both history and
psychology to discourse. How should we now regard these ventures in terms of
future investments? Should the traditional endeavors, still very robust, simply con
tinue unabated in their hegemonic trajectory? Do the emerging alternatives now
make it impossible to return to traditional work? Is there some form of amalgam
that we should seek? These are complex questions, and discussions should remain
open. However, we may draw several conclusions from the preceding discussion that
may serve as useful entries into the dialogue.
At the outset, I find myself compelled by the various arguments seeding the
discursive turn in social analysis. To be sure, the chief outcomes of historical and
psychological scholarship are bodies of discourse—books, articles, lectures, and the
like. The extent to which these bodies of discourse are referentially linked to events
outside language must always remain in question; word-object relations are forever
in motion (“infinite semiosis”), and words themselves are easily objectified even
when there are no ostensible referents. Further, when we attempt to describe the
world to which discourse could be linked, we again enter the corridors of discourse.
To be sure, we may deconstruct this line of reasoning by resorting to its own
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forms of argument. However, such an act of deconstruction, though certainly valid,
simultaneously reasserts the intelligibility of the discursive arguments.
With this said, however, we do not locate within the discursive orientation any
foundational arguments against the preceding lines of investigation. Unlike the
empirically based traditions, there is no presumption that research may proceed in
an unbiased way to reveal what is (or was) the case. Thus, there is no means of
discrediting a particular form of inquiry because it fails to participate within the
paradigm (e.g., because it fails to employ traditional canons of evidence). Rather
than ruling out forms of inquiry, then, the discursive scholar should ideally welcome
a range of possible endeavors, each of which would speak for a given community, its
traditions and values. The aim should not be to obliterate traditions of language but
to enrich them. At the same time, we are sensitized by the logic of discursive inquiry
to the potential effects of our study on intellectual, political, and societal life more
generally. Thus, while not discrediting any particular form of study out of hand, we
should explore the societal implications of all our inquiries, whether oriented around
psychological process, historical analysis, or discursive process. To publish work
without preliminary attention to the moral and political implications within one’s
cultural/historical context would, from the discursive standpoint, be arrogant if not
inhumane.
What seems favored in the end is a dialogic marriage among equals. With no
ultimate grounds of dismissal on any side, it may also be possible to appreciate the
interdependencies of these various forms of inquiry, along with complementarities
and potential affinities. With respect to interdependency, for example, with all its
critique of objectively accurate analysis, discursive inquiry must indeed rely on the
rhetoric of objectivity to render its analyses intelligible. Concerning complementarity,
analyses favoring both the social constitution and discursive construction of the
mind do tend to privilege social change over stability (liberal and transformative
agendas over conservative). However, it is very unlikely that any analyst would favor
a complete overhauling of all societal investments; absolute change would be the
equivalent of absolute chaos. Transformation is possible only against the backdrop of
a deep stability. And finally, there are opportunities for coalescence. For example,
there is a high degree of overlap between the social constitutionalist and the discur
sive constructionist efforts. With the former shifting the emphasis from psychological
states to culturally situated performances, and the latter embedding discourse within
embodied actions, a powerful form of historical analysis would be consolidated.
Perhaps within intellectual life, polygamy will prove a superior cultural form to
monogamy.

NOTES

1. See Levy (1989) and Modell (1989) for discussions of some of these limitations.
2. For more extended discussion of the emergence of social constructionism, see my 1994
volume. Realities and Relationships. For a detailed analysis of the position of historical analysis
within these debates, see Novick (1989).
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